Alternatives to Idealism

MelbournePhilosopher

Something which I have never seen covered fully in philosophy is a thorough analysis of the alternatives to idealism.

In fact, I can think of only two methods, broadly speaking, of knowledge representation used by philosophers. Idealism is one, and Relationism is another. Relationism isn't usually the term coined in those cases, but refers to Eastern ideas about Emptiness and reality.

Idealism has its roots with Plato, and Western philosophy has largely progressed from there. Under Idealism, everything has a definite "is" nature -- or to put it some other ways, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for identity, definite set members, can be operated on using the law of the excluded middle, is mutually exclusive with its opposites and has an inherent nature.

Relationism is different. It supposes that the existence of a thing and its characteristics are not owned by that thing alone, but rather include references to its context. All things are complexes -- that is that at every level of consideration, there is some further subdivision of logic possible. Yin and Yang are opposites, but at their centre is a seed of the other. Under Relationism (relativity, whatever), things only exist in context.

Some kinds of alternative logic, often based on one of these, and occasionally a synthesis, may be found. Paraconsistent logic, spearheaded by Graham Priest, is one such logical form. Objects in a paraconsistent knowledge scheme can break some of the Idealist rules outlined earlier, but do not obey Relational ones either. Rather, paraconsistent logic is an exercise in seeing what happens if you "break" logic.

There is some reason to believe that human brain processing is in fact Relational, but that conscious reasoning is broadly Idealistic. The hardware of the brain is clearly Relational, yet reasoning in this manner does not often come naturally to people.

However, it occurs to MP that there may be as yet unconsidered options. Perhaps readers could suggest some options?

I would suggest that for every claim under either scheme, it would be possible to make a meta-claim. For example "X is Red" and "(X is Red) is Idealistic", or "Y is Purple" and "(Y is Purple) is Relational".

Can the space of meta-claims be broken cleanly into Idealism and Relationism? Are these two mutually exclusive? Under some kind of logical framework, will the conclusions of one ever contradict the other? Which best captures reality? Are there some observations which may be described more naturally under one than the other? Can anyone think of any other options?

Cheers,
-MP

Abundance and Responsibility

Inequity, which often occurs when individuals have an unusual abundance, is generally thought of as a bad thing. Indeed, many philosophies (especially political philosophies) are centrally concerned with minimising inequity.

What responsibilities do individuals have towards equity (or equality, if you prefer) and to what extent do the negative aspects of inequity reduce the positive aspects of abundance?

Ones position on society and individualism will often be the central issue when considering this question. Let us for the moment ignore situations where ones own abundance causes harm to others, and just look at the case of relative advantage.

Is pleasure any better depending on who experiences it? What reason do we have for preferring our own pleasure to the pleasure of others? If we had the power to allocate pleasure to others, on what basis would we distribute it? If pleasure is a scarce resource, do we have the right to experience more than other people?

I for one sometimes experience a curious feeling when I notice that other people are not happy despire an abundant situation, or are clearly pursuing strategies which are making them unhappy. (for example, not being ambitious at work but also being made unhappy by low wages) To what extent should one simple please oneself in the face of this?

Some people will regard societal responsibility, but consider also the happiness of close friends and loved ones, whose welfare you care about. To what extent should one be indifferent to their achievement of pleasure, and pursue ones own to the greatest extent? If (for example) a close friend is needlessly miserable, to what extent should you ignore this or attempt to improve it?

This is the dilemma -- one has greatest power over ones own happiness, but when one is unhappy, it happiness seems most unattainable. When another person is unhappy, one is in fact relatively powerless to improve their situation, yet they themselves are most in need.

In some cases, the giving of affection or goods will help their situation, but this is by no means always true.

Where your own situation is abundant, but another is in need, the inequity of the situation seems to exacerbate the problem. Is your abundance itself a bad thing in that situation, or is the problem elsewhere?

Questions without answers.

Cheers,
-MP

No more I.D. in Dover

http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/12/20/intelligent.design.ap/index.html

Teaching creationism is illegal in the U.S., so this seems like the proper application of the law. It seems to be an extreme act of contortion to suggest that I.D. != creationism.

For myself, I regard I.D. as unscientific but not unreasonable. The gaps in science are smaller than the plug of religion. It has a place in education, but not in science, which has a fairly strict definition which does not seem to be in need of alteration.

To quote from the original statement by the school: "Because Darwin's theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence is discovered. The theory is not a fact. Gaps in the theory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations."

Gaps exist do exist in the theory (yet if there is no evidence for them, how do we know they are there? zing!) but neither is there counter-evidence. A common accusation made against religion is that God does appear to be "God of the Gaps". Of course, this is silly, because there are diverse religious positions, many of which have alternative explanations or indeed fully embrace evolution as the origin of life.

My current thinking is that almost nothing said in the name of religion is in fact the exclusive domain of religion, but is rather reflective of individual attitudes and preferences. As such, using religion as the basis for ones reasoning is a poor start, as there will exist an opposite view proceeding from the same basis.

Cheers,
-MP

Plato on Abundance

Another philosopher who had somewhat to say on the topic of Abundance was Plato. Unlike some others, he was essentially in favour. However, he said, we should not be unrealistic.

A suitable amount of abundance is simply necessary, in his view, to meet the needs of man. One cannot really be happy without some measure of comfort to ones environment, protection from harm, adequete food, good friends, and so forth. Charity was seen as good, however on must have a suitable level of surplus before one can engage in charity without making oneself miserable.

While Socrates never had any wealth of his own, he did not lack for abundance, thanks to the generosity of his friends.

However, he does have rather a lot to say about temperance. There is a certain line of logic to consumerism, which suggests that if a little bit of expenditure makes us a little bit happy, the path to the greatest happiness is the greatest expenditure. Unfortunately, unrestricted desire, which is regarded by some as a part of human nature, can never be truly fulfilled. While pleasing our desires is good to do, expanding our desires beyond our means is frustrating.

Unlike Schopenhauer, who suggests minimising our desires (and worse, our expectations), Plato takes a more middle-of-the-road position. In fact, he rather elevates the importance of the mental life over that of the physical, but the "Golden Mean" philosophy later promoted by Aristotle is an echo of Plato's earlier work.

Abundance, then, is not good in itself, but is necessary for the Good Life. This term (in Greek, Eudaimonia) means being committed to things that are advantageous both for the soul, mind and body. Under the term, there is no true conflict between those goals, as Plato's philosophy is idealised.

Unfortunately, I'm not an idealist, so this argument just doesn't wash with me. Oh well, abundance is still *nice*. And I do agree -- an element of temperance in ones goals, or more simply a committment to being happy with what you have, seems to be good for the soul, mind and body. Just don't get *too* comfortable!

Cheers,
-MP

Schopenhauer on Abundance

I haven't studied S directly, but I have read some interpretations. His central thesis seems to be that it's better to be pleasantly surprised, often, than unpleasantly surprised often or even with equal probability.

He suggest that people tend to be over-optimistic, and that this leads to a perpetual state of disappointments based on our failed hopes and ambitions.

A good strategy, then, is to temper those hopes and ambitions in order to experience a greater satisfaction.

It seem to me to be generally a good thing not to aim wildly beyond ones capacity due to the inevitability of disappointment, but if one aims beneath ones capacity, one is in fact foregoing satisfaction.

It seems difficult to argue on a utilitarian basis that anything other than perfect expectations could lead to the best outcome. It strikes me that Schopenhauer's method of adopting low expectations in fact lowers the utility one gains during a period of life.

The most obvious example to use is that of a relationship. If I am pessimistic about the future of that relationship, I may in the short term be happily surprised by its success. However, the best course of action given my expectations would be to guard myself against failure -- perhaps by breaking things off early, or by not committing to something which would most likely be a source of more pain than pleasure. In short, my beliefs about the success of the relationship in part determine the success of it.

On the other hand, if I am over-optimistic about the relationship, then I may in fact bring about its greater success. This could happen through such a mechanism as my partner responding to my enthusiasm, being grateful for my efforts and committment and so forth.

Without perfect knowledge about the outcomes of ones actions, it seems to be the case that neither pessimism nor optimism will lead to greater happiness. Optimism may lead to greater disappointment, but pessimism may lead to less opportunity for satisfaction. Optimism may lead to greater satisfaction, and pessimism may protect us from harm.

On consequential grounds, then, it seems that sometimes optimism will turn out to be the better strategy, and sometimes the worst.

Given that seemingly inescapable truth, it seems that the most accurate expectations will bring the greatest happiness. Oh, would that it were so easy! :)

For my relationship example, the clincher seems to be that pure optimism in fact makes me happy. So there!

Cheers,
-MP

Abundance

MelbournePhilosopher

For the longest in I don't know how long, I feel completely blessed to have so much abundance. This demands a philosophical response!

Some people claim that all art is created from dissatisfaction, but I disagree and have always done so. Some artwork, I think, springs from an entirely positive artisitic intention.

Philosophy is the same for me. While nobody else might be able to "read" my art exactly as I intended it, it is for me an equally expressive medium as language. I believe that I genuinely have entirely abstract thoughts which are expressible through art. Sometimes, the artwork includes a structure which is linked to cognitive structure, just as words are linked to meaning.

My point, insofar as I have one, is that (a) philosophy should contribute to positively motivated theories as well as negative difficulties, and that (b) this is not obvious. I'm not intending to back that claim up very much here, but at least the perspective can be understood. If it's topical, I may return and provide a more thorough analysis.

Regardless, I am currently feeling like a very lucky ducky. Given how much philosophy is dedicated to dealing with feelings of inadequecy, choosing the "right" kind of action in adverse circumstances, etc, it would be only a rigorous test to check that those same theories applied properly to examples of a multiplicity of goods as well as a multiplicity of evils.

How might, for example, and ethicist view a person who has access to both wealth, personal satisfaction, and love? Dealing with scarcity is one thing, but how is one to deal with abundance? Can abundance be relied upon? Is it better to be optimistic or pessismistic about the future, and how does this change with circumstances of abundance?

What would Nietzsche, or Schopenhauer, or the Dalai Lama say about such things? What about Jesus, or Wittgenstein, or Heidegger?

I suppose the religiously oriented would promote some kind of sacrifice or tithing of material wealth, but nonmaterial wealth has no such nature. Something like love, or happiness is not something which must be given up in order to be shared. It is, in principle, a resource with infinite supply. Does that make one greedy if one accumulates it?

In a sense, material wealth is tithed to the state in order to fund delegated responsibility. It is, I would argue, perfectly reasonable to claim than ones economic ethical demands are met by the payment of taxes.

Ah well, just lucky I guess. Probably best to be pessimistic, and continue to plan for disaster! I might turn back to the issue through the eyes of some specific philosophers in coming days, and see if their ideas stand up under abundance.

Cheers,
-MP

Racism in Australia

In the past, I've claimed that racism has little to do with the facts, but rather is about dehumanising people.

We have recently have had some riots here in Australia, reports of which are frightening to read.

There simply is no philosophical argument for racism. In fact, it can perhaps be attacked as a Sorites, or line-drawing, paradox. In short, the grounds for discrimination are arbitrary, and thus unsupportable.

The question is why we have significant numbers of people who are so easily whipped up into violence? It would be easy to suggest that pure youthful rebellion could be the cause, but I think that the media, governments and other sources of authority have themselves to blame also.

For any Idealist, it is difficult to see terrorism and incomprehensible foreigners in complex terms. When the world is seen through black and white, polarity is the only possibility. The representation of the world in these terms by the media, the government and other figures of authority has been quite sad in my opinion. As I see it, more intelligent reporting and representing could easily have avoided this sad outcome.

When people are angry, that anger demands an outlet. Unless that anger is properly connected to the real cause of people's unhappiness, it can only ever find an inappropriate expression.

The human mind can never wholly eliminate either good or evil, but either can be exaggerated. The rioters no doubt included people with whom I would get along in other circumstances. Casting them in the light of rednecked morons, while containing an element of the truth, is not the whole truth either. That is only to compound a problem of polarisation with further polarisation.

I condemn their actions, but I also find the entire situation sad, and all too avoidable. I hope we see a strong response to this by the government and media sources.

Cheers,
-MP

Seditious Philosophy

I read with some interest the sadly short piece of philosophy by Charles Richardson. In his defense, there is no other way to approach the problem in this format, but perhaps some short discussion would be useful. Firstly, the contradiction is that peace is a virtue, while violence is a vice -- hence "vicious". It would seem then that the support for violent ends must always be a vice. What, then, is sedition other than a vicious act? The way to resolve the dilemma is in terms how how all violence is justified -- in terms of the greater good. While violent ends are clearly wrong, violent means have been pursued throughout history to ends of ambiguous virtue. The existing sedition legislation is little more than a support structure for the existing power heirarchies of our society. It is phrased not in terms of violent ends, but in self-serving terms which make the institution itself the ultimate moral goal. The phrase which I think is most problematic is now quoted: "[it is a crime] to excite disaffection against the Government or Constitution of the Commonwealth or against either House of the Parliament of the Commonwealth;".

The key works, I think, are being co-opted into wider arguments surrounding the incumbent government. I think it is reasonable to legislate against violent attacks on government and constitutional democracy as such, and few people would disagree. The ambiguity over the term "disaffection" suggests that the laws may be enforceable against peaceful protest, and perhaps be used for party political goals, which calls for careful attention. Wider readings of the proposed legislation are not so ambiguous, however.

Nonetheless, it seems at least possible to have phrased the anti-sedition laws solely in terms of protection from violence. The question is why this has not been done.

Cheers,
-MP