An excerpt from Language Truth and Logic by Alfred Ayer.

The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is that criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. And with regard to questions the procedure is the same. We inquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way of the other; and, if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does.

As the adoption of this procedure is an essential factor in the argument of this book, it needs to be examined in detail.

In the first place, it is necessary to draw a distinction between practical verifiability, and verifiability in principle. Plainly we all understand, and in many cases believe, propositions which we have not in fact taken steps to verify. Many of these are propositions which we could verify if we took enough trouble. But there remain a number of significant propositions, concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the situation where the relevant observations could be made. A simple and familiar example of such a proposition is the proposition that there are mountains on the farther side of the moon. No rocket has yet been invented which would enable me to go and look at the farther side of the moon, so that I am unable to decide the matter by actual observation. But I do know what observations would decide it for me, if, as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a positions to make them. On the other hand, such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition such as “the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress”1, is not even in principle verifiable. For one cannot conceive of an observation which would enable one to determine whether the Absolute did, or did not, enter into evolution and progress. Of course it is possible that the author of such a remark is using English words in a way in which they are not commonly used by English-speaking people, and that he does, in fact, intend to assert something which could be empirically verified. But until he makes us understand how the proposition that he wishes to express would be verified, he fails to communicate anything to us. And if he admits, as I think the author of the remark in question would have admitted, that his words were not intended to express either a tautology or a proposition which was capable, at least in principle, of being verified, then it follows that he has made an utterance which has no literal significance even for himself.

Emptiness

At the Heart of Philosophy on Wednesday night, Graham Priest touched on the Eastern idea of Emptiness. This is the idea, loosely, that "things" aren't really anything singular in themselves, but rather are a collection of independant things, identified by their relationship of having come together.

This is simple to see - a car is exactly the same "thing" whether identified by "that car over there" or by "those doors, those four wheels etc". There is no mistake introduced by referring to the whole, or the sum of its parts.

What if people, or souls, are like this? Is there any difference between "me" and "my memories, my legs, my arms, my body, what I am currently thinking about etc".

If not, what is the difference between "what I am thinking" and "what you are thinking"? Is there any real sense in which "I" die, if the parts in me live on, or are represented elsewhere. I think it would be better to live, but suppose all the things I hold dear actually do live on in others. I am not the only person who loves, who thinks, who is angry, who thinks about philosophy. Those aspects of myself which I would be most sad to lose perhaps are not really mine to claim.

Cheers,
-MP

My mind, the mirror

Is my mind a mirror?

To put it another way, if philosophy is all about acquiring good knowledge of the world, including abstract knowledge such as relationships between things, good critical thought processes, etc, then am I not simply changing my mind to fit the world?

Is this really how I would like to see the summary of my life : MelbournePhilosopher was an interesting man who was partially successful in changing his mind to accurately reflect what the world is like? It seems like somewhat of a cold description of the meaning of a life.

The alternative, however, seems little better -- to be mistaken about the world.

To what extent is a little uncertainty good for us, and what would life be like if we had access to unquestionable correct information? Would our lives be better, or worse? If we had it, thus obviating the need for learning anything incorrect, what might we do or achieve with our lives?

Are normative things, like ethics, properly within that domain, or not?

Cheers,
-MP

The money or the box

I am on a mailing list whose central theme is discussion of artificial intelligence, usually sociologically speaking rather than implementationally speaking. One of the topics which comes up now and then is a kind of test, which is superficially like the famous Turing test, which I will now outline.

An artificial intelligence is placed in some kind of box -- think of it perhaps as a disconnected computer, with limited ability to actually *do* anything, other than communicate directly with a small group of people known as the gatekeepers.

However, it is of such tremendous intelligence and power that were it connected to (for example) the Internet, it could rapidly achieve world domination, and complete control over all major infrastructure. However, it could also use this tremendous power for good -- for example by running our train networks more efficiently, improving medical science through its incredible access to knowledge and research abilities. In essence, it is a godlike creature, but incapable of realising its full potential except through an initial helping hand.

There is no guarantee that this AI will be friendly, hostile, honest, a liar, etc. The challenge is to see whether a real-world gatekeeper would choose to release such an AI, for whatever reason, or whether they could keep such a tremendous force at bay.

Playing the role of the AI for the purposes of these tests is actually a human. This obviously makes it a somewhat weaker test, for the gatekeeper is always safe in the knowledge that their decisions will have no actual repercussions.

But the question is still an interesting variation on Pandora's Box. As a race, do we stand more to gain than to lose by taking such a risk? Are people fundamentally attracted or repelled by the idea of a world that is materially better, but essentially under the control of an artificial intelligence? Are people actually convinced by the idea that an AI could achieve true consciousness?

What are the human reactions to AI? What can this tell us about the likely response to things like robots, increased anthropomorphisation of technology in households and the eventual beginnings of artificial intelligence? If anything, it is perhaps that philosophy will be irrelevant. People are natural born believers, and if the appearance of intelligence is good enough, then there simply will not be any strong reaction to what's going on "under the hood".

Cheers,
-MP

Strange Bedfellows

I have already made one post thanking those people who are in my community and whose paths I have run across during the course of this blog. Today I thought I would look at people with links to this site, but come from unexpected quarters. I ran a search for links back here, and looked through the first five pages of results. In search return order, they are :

Coreline, Analysis in Industry . From his page: CoreLine is the web journal of Richard de Rozario. My professional interest is in all manner of analysis in industry, along Lewinian lines of "there is nothing so practical as a good theory". Richard is an Auditor, and is also pursuing a Ph.D. in philosophy.

http://benhourigan.com/ From his page: I, Ben Hourigan, B.A. (Hons) (Melb.) am a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Outside of writing my doctoral thesis on the political content of role-playing videogames, I spend time writing my first novel, and have lectured and tutored in Cultural Studies. I also do editing work on contract.. Ben stopped by here a while back, and was kind enough to link back!

CORROSIVE JOURNALISM . From his page :

Date-Time Stamp: 10 July 1969 at 5:00am, or 35 trips around the sun before now

Birthing Location: Brisbane, Queensland

Species: homo sapiens (male)

Home Sweet Home: Melbourne, Victoria

Ninglun's Site Lives Again From Ninglun's site: I am a semi-retired English teacher, live in an inner Sydney suburb, and that's as much as you need to know... Except that "Ninglun" pseudonym may puzzle you. I am not Chinese, but my ex-partner and current friend is. So I found myself a Mandarin equivalent for Neil, which happens also to mean "peaceful discussion." The other pseudonym, "Floating Life", sums me up really, but also alludes to a beautiful Chinese autobiography, "Six Chapters from a Floating Life" by Shen Fu.

Cosmocentric. From the site : Is it possible to be always on the run? To escape from the old place and settle in a new one? Only questions for now. Who am I? An androgynous, a-sexual, a-genderous creature? Always hiding from view and when they find me, discover me — I just take to flight. I just run — till […]

Milinda's Questions From her site : Welcome to Milinda’s Questions.

This blog takes its name from the Milindapanha, or “The Questions of King Milinda.” For those who aren’t familiar with the work, here’s a description from a recent translator:

So thanks for the links guys. Here's to you.

Cheers,
-T

Being Interesting

MelbournePhilosopher

One of the most boring books I have ever read was entitled "How to be more Interesting". It was authored by one Edward de Bono, but I didn't find much to chew on between its covers.

Yet it is not fair to single him out for being a windbag. Worst of all, I think I'm probably guilty of it myself. It's easy to recognise something interesting when we see it -- one might almost say that there is a whole emotion called "interestedness" which comes into play. So why, given this, is it so hard to *be* interesting?

When I find someone else interesting, it is usually the result of an unlikely coming together of an animated presentation, a topic which I find interesting, my being in just the right state of mind (i.e. not hungry, asleep or distracted), and of course physical proximity. Given how rarely all those come together, perhaps it should be no surprise that interest can be so difficult to find.

One might hope that a degree of discrimination would assist however in at least improving ones chanced. By reading important authors, who write on challenging topics, surely we should have some hope that we might be about to whet our appetites for enjoyment?

Moreover, by avoiding some of the most common pitfalls of repetitiveness, poor command of language and repetitiveness, surely we could ourselves manage be be more interesting people, on the whole?

Sadly, I think not.

Cheers,
-T

10-day Summary

MelbournePhilosopher

First of all, my humble apologies for the lack of postings. I have been quietly redefining "busy" to all new levels. Over the last ten days, I have had some personal committments, gotten a paper accepted to the Australian Partnership for Advanced Computing, held down my day job and otherwise managed to have insufficient mental energy to provide anything of quality via this medium.

So, if you like, pull up a chair, and we'll talk again about public philosophy.

Today, my philosophy tutorial was one of the most enjoyable ever. Everyone, bar none, is interesting, vocal and intelligent. Much like a successful dinner party, everyone felt rejuvenated by the interchange of ideas, the feeling of society, and the playful exercise. Unlike a successful dinner party, nobody had to foot the bill.

This is the continuing hope of all people who favour an increase in public philosophy. Things like this, more often, would make our lives better. Just like playing a game of social sport, or going out to dinner, philosophical argument is both fun and good for you. In fact, most people engage in some form of intellectual play regularly, and with relish. So why is it that philosophy become relegated to universities, where it is considered dry challenging work, and unhelpful for practical purposes?

I would say the reasons are circumstantial -- which is also to suggest that if the circumstances were /different/, then so might the perception and involvement with philosophy. The feeling I have is somewhat contrary to the general elitist view of the "common man", but it is not entirely without condescention.

A common attitude taken by philosophers is that the common man somehow lacks the constitution for philosophy. Certainly, it is to be agreed and encouraged that not all people will share the same appetites, including that for abstract argument, but that is not the point being advanced. Rather great thinkers (a station with which I do not self-identify) regard themselves as quite different in kind from other people, and generally superior.

My opinion is that I have never met a healthy individual who does not get a great deal of pleasure from intellectual play at whatever their interest and academic level might be. The most obvious form of this is in joking -- a joke is little more than intellectual playfulness. At their most base, jokes are about gaining pleasure from misfortune, but most people find humor more in ridiculous circumstances, or the confusion of abstract ideas, or in changing perspective to something unexpected and absurd.

Perhaps, then, the task of the joker is not so different from the task of the philosopher. While the philosopher may take a very serious attitude to their work -- and I think it is valid to respect anyone tackling a hard or meaningful problem -- nonetheless their methods are in examining extreme circumstances, resolving confusions of abstract ideas, or finding a new perspective by which to understand an issue.

Might not philosophy be finally successful if it were marketed as merely the biggest, best joke?

Cheers,
-MP

Neato Memory Test

MelbournePhilosopher

I just took this memory test

I got a 95% overall recall rate, correctly identifying 23/24 previously seen faces from a group of 48. I scored 82% on temporal location, which is to say I identified 19 of the 24 faces as coming from "phase 1" or "phase 2" of the test, out of the same group of 48.

95 (avg 92) : 23/24

82 (avg 68) : 19/24

Cheers,
-MP

The Return of the Wiki

MelbournePhilosopher

Some readers may have noticed that the companion website has been down for several weeks. This was due to a hard disk failure, and a lack of backups. I have restored the site somewhat, and will continue to bring it back towards its previous level of functionality.

I have been exceptionally busy of late pursuing other projects, so apologies for the lack of posts. Normal transmission to resume towards the end of next week.

Cheers,
-MP

Elitism, Justification and Philosophy

MelbournePhilosopher

I recently attended my first tutorial of "What is Philosophy?", this semester's Uni subject.

We were looking at Plato's republic, and more specifically at whether you could genuinely put in place a philosopher king to rule. The consensus, unsurprisingly, was that it was a silly idea. Here is what I thought was the most interesting dilemma.

Sometimes, you want to constrain a leader for acting without consideration for the larger populace, such as malignant dictators. Sometimes, you want to ignore the populace, because they are being thick and not getting the point, like banning the use of mobile phones in cars, or occasionally you do see populist but extreme regimes getting elected in democratic countries. You know, like Germany.

Ultimately, power is something that is conferred. Sometimes it is conferred by everyone, sometimes it is in the hands of the few. It seems to be the starting position that each individual has equal power, but that some of them delegate their power to others, which introduces inequity. Inequity can be compounded by technology and other factors also.

Through the use of a constitution and a judiciary, you can constrain the abuse of power by the powerful. Plato tried to counter the problem of abuse by supposing that a philosopher of pure heart would not be tempted by power. It is difficult to take this suggestion seriously, as it seems like we are all of us sinners, no matter how well intentioned we might be. In Plato's system, anything less that a perfect leader could subvert the system, whereas a democracy, at least in principle, enables bloodless revolution in leadership.

Here is a question for you all : what things are you elitist about? That is to say, what things do you believe are true and should be imposed upon others even though they might disagree with you? I'll try to post my own list at some point soon.

Cheers,
-MP

Science and philosophy

MelbournePhilosopher

I was discussing philosophy with a friend of mine, who pointed out a difference between science and philosophy. In science, it is often possible to identify luminary thinkers, people whose ideas and work massively advanced human knowledge.

In single steps, people like Faraday, Descartes, Newton etc were able to gain new insights which were quite stunning.

In philosophy, the great thinkers reached their goals less through insight, and more as a result of dogged hard work, in small increments. Often, the better progress is made through the re-interpretation of those new ideas by those that came later. The better philosophy is often an interpretation of Plato, rather than Plato himself, or a critique of Nietzche rather than the man himself.

I'm sure some will disagree, but I think it's an interesting divide. Philosophy is not advanced by revolution, but by evolution.

Cheers,
-T