Can literature present an argument?

Tim Winton’s Minimum of Two is an anthology of short stories, which portrays the nature of human relationships in graphic detail. Recently, I found myself thinking differently about people in my life since studying this book as an English text. When I caught myself taking lessons from Winton’s book, I was struck by an unsettling thought. This book has not presented an argument about life. That is, it has not said that “Relationships are important because the world is so-and-so.” Rather, Minimum of Two has simply presented a world in which relationships are important. Minimum of Two has given no exploration of whether the Minimum of Two world corresponds to the real world at all – and, therefore, no exploration of whether relationships are important in real life. Does it make sense, then, to be taking advice about real life from this book? – or, for that matter, from any piece of literature? For literature does this: it presents a world where some principles, propositions or structures are true. Simply presenting a world in which something is true does not say anything about whether it is true in our world and, therefore, whether we should accept it as a guiding principle.

What, then, is the purpose of literature? I see the role two-fold. Firstly, premises in an abstract argument may be difficult to state in plain language. Consider an argument:

If human dignity is valuable, then we should treat people with respect.

Human dignity is valuable.

Therefore we should treat people with respect.

This argument, as it stands, seems highly lacking. What is meant by “human dignity,” “value” and “respect”? Furthermore, what kind of explanation will help us? A technical definition of “dignity” gives us:

dig·ni·ty

The quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect.

(From www.dictionary.com)

Does help us at all?

It takes a human sketch of what dignity is in a real situation for us to understand what “dignity” really means. I can see no way to understand the concept of ‘dignity’ other than by being show an example of a person with or without dignity. Literature is perfect for showing such an example. Whilst literature cannot prove whether human dignity is valuable, it can elucidate exactly what we mean by human dignity (this is one of the central preoccupations of Ernest G. Gaines’s A Lesson Before Dying).

Second, consider a proposition that we already agree to be true. Often, it is difficult to see what the full breadth of an abstract concept until we see a story written which emphasizes this concept. Suppose were to become convinced, by some highly ordered argument, that “man is radically free” – i.e. that man is far less constrained in his actions than he believes himself to be. What is this fact, alone, by itself? This fact is cold! It may be true, but we have no emotional connection to it. Literature is able to form this emotional connection. By connecting with a character in a story, by feeling his pain and his triumphs, we can understand what a concept means in a spiritual sense. Literature allows us to feel for a concept after we already understand it.

Nonetheless, literature cannot present an argument. A piece of literature tells a story, and this story has no guarantee of being consistent with the real world. If I stated, with no evidence at all, that “Businessmen are the hidden sustainers of the world,” no intelligent person would agree with me unless they already knew of a reason why businessmen were “the hidden sustainers of the world.” What does a piece of literature such as Atlas Shrugged do except to state this premise, albeit in beautiful prose and descriptive language? If we do accept a contention due to a piece of literature, must we then conclude that we’ve had our emotions seized upon, and been manipulated to accept an argument devoid of logical justification?

Josh.

Philosophy for Groups One -- Justification

MelbournePhilosopher

This term refers to the chain of ideas by which we arrive at a particular belief, and is linked to wider issues of epistemology, a technical word loosely meaning “theory of knowledge.” The kind of justification that most people might be familiar with is scientific or empirical justification. This is essentially a pointing-out of things in the world to back up our beliefs. The scientific method is one formal approach to this, and has been the basis for much technological development.

However, this idea can also be applied purely within the realm of ideas. Some facts are removed from the physical world, and the scientific method itself depends on accepting various kinds of progressions of ideas as being good to use. The most obvious is accepting logical reasoning, but there are also other aspects to this, such as principles of preferring a simple explanation to a complicated one.

Certainly illogical ideas are the easiest ones to reject – someone whose beliefs conflict with each other cannot easily be right on all counts. Sometimes people adopt different beliefs for different contexts, which is pompously called “separate magisteria”, but this is rather different from someone who simply holds a confused set of beliefs about the world.

In order to justify ideas which are not clearly related to physical things, we need another kind of litmus test for working out whether something is worth believing or not.

Philosophy for Groups

MelbournePhilosopher

MP believes he has spotted a gap in the philosophical market. That gap is a series of short philosophy articles, designed to fit together conceptually, for use in small casual discussion groups, such as a philosophical or church discussion group.

MP is involved with several friends in just such a discussion group. This posting is a short exerpt from just such a series. I would appreciate any feedback you might have! The initial subject, the problem of skepticism, is about 4 pages long, and will be posted in sections over the next few weeks.
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Session One -- The Problem of Skepticism

How do we know that the external world exists? The most common response is – how can we not? One of the most fundamental ideas shared by people everywhere is the idea that we are right to assign a lot of importance to the world around us. By this is meant our relationships with other people, morality, history, the state of matters. But when we look at the justification for that importance, we often find that we are working with ideas that don't fully make sense, or are in some sense arbitrary.

In “The Matrix ”, humanity is enslaved in an entirely illusory world. To some extent, many religions also require a belief that the world around us is of a mystical nature, including many things which are not real in the everyday physical sense of the word.

How is it that we can identify what things we should be skeptical about, and what things we should believe? The answer is justification. Before we can know something, we need to be able to identify the reasons we have for saying we know it.

This is made clear by considering the reverse case – the rambling claims of someone who is insane, or has a strong belief in an absurd idea, without that idea having a basis in truth or reason. A modern-day false prophet, if you will.

A key question for many people who adopt religious faith is whether their faith falls into the same category of unjustified beliefs. Some people are profoundly uncomfortable that the root of their beliefs appears to have little wider justification, and many atheists level precisely that accusation against those who adopt religious faith.

Like most hard problems, there is a lot of disagreement about how reasonable it is to adopt religious faith, or indeed many other kinds of belief about the world which are non-religious. This section aims to give an overview of how philosophers have tackled this problem, which is what they have termed “The problem of skepticism.”

A lack of multimedia

MelbournePhilosopher

I would very much like to post a photo that I took recently, but the software continues to report errors. How annoying!!!

I seem to have been plagued by technical problems recently - it took me a week to get my new ADSL modem working, whereupon my PC hard drive promptly failed, forcing me to do a re-install of everything, losing many great photos along the way. I managed to restore it to life, but the PC continues to somewhat misbehave. And now this! Why can't everything Just Work?

I am, however, somewhat proud of the equanimity with which I have accepted these frustrating occurences. Perhaps I have managed to connect with my inner Stoic self. (In other news, I'm planning to move into a barrel soon, and spend my time walking around the streets of Melbourne bothering people).

In any case, it is felt that too long has gone without posting, and some measure of explanation is called for. So that's that.

More philosophically, and issue which has been playing on my mind recently is the right-to-die. It seems to this blogger than people's liberty on this issue should be respected, yet at the same time the potential for abuse seems perhaps greater than the potential for additional freedom. This is, if you will, a free will debate. Which is to be respected more - the strength of individual choice, or the need to protect people, including against themselves and their weak, malleable wills?

The free will debate is often seen as a battle between having real choice, or living a predestined existence, but it is much closer to home when it is considered as a tension between honouring the power of choice, versus being fearful of the impositions and demands made of us which might cause our determination to fail.

As a general principle, do people here have any fixed opinion on the psychological strength of people, and the power of individual choice? Which is the greater principle, liberty or protection?

Cheers,
-MP

A strong example of moral relativism

MelbournePhilosopher

Right, here's an example of something I think demonstrates moral relativism. Here in Australia, it's traditional to wear black clothes to a funeral. In Japan, I hear white is a traditional colour.

In Australia, if you wore white, under most circumstances, people would judge as doing something wrong. Yet the reverse is true in Japan!

This example is so simple that most people don't think of it as exhibiting moral relativism - they jump straight to the principle in question - namely that you should wear a conventional colour. But this is a mistake, or so I would argue. Why?

Because it's not true that they are interchangeable. The people involved will have other learned responses to funereal colours, they will have emotional reactions not to the incongruity but to the colour itself.

Yet, I would argue, there is no rational principle which says that black is necessarily a better colour than white to wear to a funeral. There is nothing that would cause us to reject either viewpoint. Each culture has a rich heritage, and can justify their choice of colour.

In today's world, most people would not pass judgement on the Japanese for wearing white to a funeral -- at least in China. But despite this acceptance of diversity in moral behaviour, it remains morally wrong to wear white to a funeral in Australia.

The implication of this is that many things which we consider to be moral judgements could, according to a solely rational examination, equally well be different. Driving on the other side of the road; nude sunbathing; pornography; bachelor parties; euthanasia; the deliberate killing of other people in some circumstances; punishment; respect for authority.

It strikes me that the only reasonable conclusion to draw is that there is no such thing as an objective and absolute morality. Why? Because these acts are all variously judged as moral or immoral, but exhibit little variation as to the quality of their rational justification.

Cheers,
-MP

A quote I stumbled across

MelbournePhilosopher

"Now that this is a po-pomo world, how is Modernism to be understood? Artistic progress has proved to be an illusion. Manifestoes have become impossible."
-Anon

An Invitation to Dinner

MelbournePhilosopher

On Saturday week, New Zealand blogger Richard Chappell will be in town. I've tried to email people individually, but if any readers are interested in coming along, email me at tennessee@tennessee.id.au, and I will fill you in on the details. Saturday 23rd at 7:30pm at Fed. Square.

Cheers,
-MP

Appreciating Others

MelbournePhilosopher

I have been listening to some self-help tapes by Anthony Robbins lately, and I am trying to take some of his advice on board. His comments always make sense, but he combines with with an enthusiasm and love which really shines through. He gets caught up with his own presentation, and you can't help but get taken along for the ride.

While at one level this is a simple technique to get people engaged, he goes further by making his progression of ideas very well-reasoned, and very clear. He is inspirational both emotionally and intellectually. False inspiration can ultimately be disappointing, but he seems genuine to me. If that's a rational weakness on my part, well, so be it - I'm only human dammit!

One of the things he recommends is to dwell more on the things you are grateful for -- especially people and relationships. This blog is an odd combination of a lonely journey, and also a connection with others. I always prefer to think of my comments as an unapologetic statement of opinion, but never as being "a man with a message", or seeking to simply force a position.

I would like to take a moment to express my gratitude for the people I have met through this blog. I have found it to be a quiet corner of the 'net, but a few people have taken the time to stop by. So here is a short tribute to them.

Richard, of course, is a regular contributor and a long-standing reader. I also stop by his blog at least once a week, more often when possible. His logical abilities are excellent, and he never introduces the tone of superiority than can so quickly bring a great argument to its knees. So thanks Richard, for your regular readership, and constructive criticism.

Bill, another Melbourne man, who spent some short but highly appreciated time here recently. The obscure and frequently academic topics which get debated here suffer from a lack of realism, although I myself treat philosophy as a life skill. Bill's contributions have always provided great contributions, often in the form of specific historical stories and/or anecdotes. Thanks for keeping it real.

Paul, thanks for your many comments. It's great to see you stopping by so often.

Clive, ever the realist. He never lets me fly too far from the ground with my rambles.

Oh, god, now I know I'm going to forget people. I hate it when I forget people, because I really do appreciate them all, even though they might slip my mind at this instant.

Becky and Guile, two new visitors - hello there. Thanks for the kind comments.

Oh look, this is starting to read like an academy awards speech, and I haven't even thanked my Mom yet. I'm going to stop before it gets silly. For everyone, including the people I haven't mentioned, thanks for all the contributions. And most of all, thank you for letting me sound like an idiot, and not giving me too much hell over it!

Cheers,
-MP

Moral Relativism

MelbournePhilosopher

There has been a lot of debate here on MP, and also over at Philosophy, etc over moral relativism. This was kicked off when I claimed that I thought it would be impossible to practically justify terrorism, regardless of your moral position, and would have to appeal ultimately to unjustified faith in order to defend it.

My views on moral relativism then came under attack, not unfairly, but I still think incorrectly. I can't work out whether my arguments seem weak to other people, but they make sense to me. I'll try to outline how I think moral relativism "works".

Firstly : Let us entirely discount situations where the people concerned are mistaken about facts. For example, if I believe that you killed my best friend, I am also going to believe that you committed an evil act. Am I wrong to do so? Let's say I have reasonable evidence and I am justified in doing so. Did you commit an evil act? No. Do I hold a false moral judgement about your actions? Yes. It's trivially easy to use mistaken beliefs to reach an incorrect moral position. Examples where someone is merely mistaken about the facts are not good counter arguments.

If I adopt a moral principle which you believe is wrong, and you accept that my understanding of the facts is correct, then we have a true disagreement.

The position of the moral relativist is not that merely by believing something mistaken, you can arrive at correct moral judgements. The position is that different moral judgements are possible from a correct understanding of the facts, and that those different positions are equally valid.

It is my further position that the definition of morality per se means an acceptance of society's goals as your own. If your society believes, for example, that retributive justice is morally right, and you refuse to adopt that moral position, even though you have no problem with their interpretation of the facts, then you are acting immorally. By my definition, morality is a group understanding. We each have our own individual moral faculty, but it is wrong to exalt out moral beliefs above that of society. Perhaps you have the belief that justice should be solely about rehabilitation of the criminal. Let us suppose for the moment that both possibilities are equally justifiable. My position is that you are not acting morally if you place your own opinion to be more important that the judgement of your peers. If nothing else, it is plain that you will be judged at immoral by that society. Morality has no anchor outside of what is accepted by society. Morality means accepting society's goals as your own, and adopting their beliefs as your own.

I think it is clear that at a psychological level, this is plainly obvious. All the way from capital punishment, to the clothes you wear, there is diversity in the number of societies. Within those societies, certain things simply are judged wrong by them.

I don't see any other way to incorporate this basic truth into philosophy other than by accepted each position as valid. One person alone cannot be a perfect moral judge, for no one person is fully cogniscant even of their own moral reactions and/or principles. Morality is a fuzzy, dirty, confused set of beliefs and attitudes which arise from ones physical nature, ones society, ones intellect, even ones happiness will affect a person's instinctive moral judgement. And none of these differing moral positions are clearly invalid.

Moral absolutists would have us believe that, in principle anyway, every single act could be assessed according to various moral principles, the same each time without regard for said context, culture and society. I return merely to the example I gave at the outset - that computer crime was not wrong in the year dot!

So, what happens when society "slips up"? What is happening when we judge a culture as "evil" with the benefit of hindsight. Examples like slavery, cannibalism and sacrifice come to mind. In each, I think it is easy enough to identify simple facts about which people were mistaken. Their moral faculty had been subverted by indoctrination with false beliefs about the world. Does this make them bad people? I return to the example of mistakenly attributing a crime to another person. Am I a bad person to judge you as wrong, even though my context gave me little choice? Or was I merely mistaken? Can we really take someone's actions outside of their social context, and apply them to a consistent set of principles, identified by their accordance with whatever virtues we find pleasing?

This is not to say that I believe that "slavery is right", that is to miss my point entirely. But when I pass judgement on a society in which slavery was considered morally good, what am I doing other than making another, different moral judgement? The question is loaded because we can identify so many other principles that are at stake - the happiness of the people involved, the quality of life, principles of welfare etc, which are justified not only by our moral position but by things outside of it. Principles like proceeding properly from facts to conclusions do not depend on a moral position. What I am doing beyond merely passing a moral judgement is passing a rational judgement. They should have known better. For example, slaves were thought to be stupid. Stupidity, however, is not dependant on a moral judgement, but it is a matter of fact.

An example of a moral judgement which differs across society, but is not subject to factual correction, is the kind of thing to which I am referring. Such a thing might be choosing which divinity to put your faith in, if you are of that persuasion. Or whether euthanasia should be a crime. Whether "respect" is a major part of your social heirarchy. What your voting system is.

I am quite willing to accept that there are some principles, such as the value of human life, which must always be considered morally good, but the force of that "must" doesn't come from a moral judgement, but from an intellectual one. It doesn't make sense to devalue human life. It's not rational to elevate some humans above others without some proper basis.

Some people become angry, because they think that such a position reduces their moral judgements to meaninglessness. What value can a moral judgement have, if the opposite position is also allowed? Well, it has plenty of meaning -- it still defines your happiness, the success of your relationships with others, it prevents you from descending into certain behaviours. In short, it plays a tremendously valuable role in your life, in spite of and not in conflict with the idea that it could very easily be different.

At the end of the day, morality is about working with your society, towards goals which you all accept as your own. Some of those goals are defined by what it means to be human - i.e. they come from everyone's personal goals for happiness, elevated to a moral good by virtue of their commonality - while other are defined by nothing more than an accident of history. They remain the goals of your society.

Cheers,
-MP

Morality and Terrorism Per Se (part deux)

MelbournePhilosopher

For me, morality is established evolutionarily. That is to say, it is largely a historical accident, which has survived the trials of psychology and practicality. All people have an equal role in establishing their society's morality. The morality of a society is a gestalt of all the moral beliefs held by its individuals, but those moral beliefs are themselves beliefs about societal norms. A person's moral beliefs are the result of interaction with their society, and are an acceptance of society's moral goals as goals of their own.

In a highly diverse society, many people will have different moral beliefs, which would seem to invalidate what was just said. Since all members of society do not have uniform beliefs, how can society be the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong? Well, here's how. Society is really just the name for all the people we interact with - it's a useful name to give to a particular group of people. It's an alternative description of a collection of object, much as "gas" is a description of the behaviour of a large number of particles. Just as "gas" cannot capture the specific motions of the particles inside it, so "society" cannot capture the full diversity of its individuals.

Each person, then, has moral beliefs that are uniquely theirs, but that have been given them due to their interaction with others. Just as a gas adopts certain properties as a result of the interaction of its members, so society develops particular features. Some are clearly recogniseable, and some are not. Social taboos are examples of moral features of a society. Public nudity, for example, is a social taboo of Western culture. People have adopted the belief that this is morally wrong from their society.

Hence the question: Is the wrongness of terrorism something like a nudity taboo - that is, something that we believe is wrong only because we have adopted that belief from our society? The corollary of this is that believing terrorism to be right could also be that kind of thing - it might be possible to believe that terrorism is justifiable in some circumstances.

Let me put down a few points, with brief argumentation for each.

1.) Let's a assume that terrorism's value is purely consequential. It's not like happiness i.e. a good in itself, but rather it is valued for what it achieved.
2.) Let's identify two particular examples. One, let us suppose that we have two societies, both of which are evolutionarily fit, which is to say that they are robust in the face of danger, not susceptible to sudden revolution etc etc. The first is pro-terrorism, and the second is anti-terrorism. Can we identify this as an absurd example? Two, let us suppose instead that we have a pro-terrorism society which is evolutionarily unfit, and an anti-terrorism society which is evolutionarily fit.
3.) We should further consider whether terrorist acts are being committed with the blessing of society or not.

Let me quickly deal with the final point - that a terrorist act, indeed any act - cannot in practise or theory be a morally good act in the eyes of society, if that act is not carried out with the blessing of society. This is a simple truism if one accepts the societal definition of morality given above. The act could be in keeping with the moral beliefs of the particular actor, but cannot be ultimately judged "moral" by others. For me, a moral act is not merely a matter of the moral beliefs of the actor, but judged against actual standards for action, given by the beliefs of others.

Secondly - our tales of two cities. Let me call in each example the anti-terrorism society "Get-along-town".

In our first example, the beliefs of Get-along-town are in conflict with the beliefs of Pro-terrorism town. By construction, each society has equal claim to have justified true beliefs about their morality. That is to say, they should be able to examine their moral beliefs, and show how this is consistent with a evolutionarily fit society, show how their beliefs are internally consistent, etc etc. Is that ever really possible? Could a rigorous philosopher really manage to reconcile a pro-terrorism stance with those standards of justification?

In our second example, Pro-terrorism town has by construction failed the test of justified true beliefs. I would argue that while it is possible, psychologically speaking, for people to hold unjustified false beliefs, it is impossible to call moral judgements on the basis of those beliefs fully correct.

Religious faith can be included in this analysis, without assuming the non-existence of God. I would suggest that it is reasonable to believe a particular spiritual position if those beliefs can be rationalised with practical limits, standards of behaviour, internal consitency (or at least paraconsistency!) etc. It is, I would argue, unreasonable to believe a particular spiritual position if that position entails a descructive mode of existence - that is runs counter to the ability of society to prosper and continue. Even faith has a standard of justification, and as such, unreasonable faith cannot be used to justify a moral position. It is not, in my opinion, unreasonably to adopt a belief in either God or Allah, but it is unreasonable to use that belief to justify the destruction of a society, or engage in purely destructive behaviour for its own sake, etc.

Richard has been challenging my first post on this topic, and I was struggling to adequetly answer his challenge. This post consitututes a somewhat more formal description of what I believe the situation to be. I think we can quickly discount the second example - where terrorism is judged morally right on the basis of untenable beliefs. I don't think Richard has a problem with this.

He also questioned whether my societal definition of morality is sensible, but hopefully this post elucides a little why I think this is so.

The question then is whether the constructed example of an evolutionarily fit society which is pro-terrorism can plausibly exist. If not, the example breaks down, and terrorism can never be morally justified.

Clearly, such a society can survive /in the face/ of terrorism - but that is not the same thing as identifying terrorism as being in accord with the principles I have outlined as necessary. It is possible to society to continue even if some of its members commit terrorist actions, possibly in accordance with their beliefs, but is it possible that those individuals would pass the test of society's judgement? To put it another way, can society itself ever be pro-terrorism. To understand this, we much look at the consequential value of terrorism.

What is the result of terrorism? Used undirected, what the the immediate results? The level of damage involved is usually painful, but low relative to war or simple assault. Fear, panic, anger and pain are the results. This is seen, broadly speaking, as a bad thing. It is not sensible to want these things for their own sake. Thus, the only use for terrorism is as a threat, or because other actions are enabled by virtue of said panic, anger, pain etc.

I do not have scientific backup for this claim, but it seems uncontroversial that there is no direct benefit to a society in being panicky, afraid, enraged or in pain. Neither do there seem to be any direct flow-on benefits. None of those features seem to be linked to anything either morally or practical good. It does not seem that a society will ever be more successful as a result of terrorism.

The only use for terrorism then would seem to be if some particular situation could be best remedied through terrorism. It was suggested by Richard that if a society had in some way collapsed, then perhaps terrorism could be a way of shocking it into action. This does not seem to be a strong argument to me. It is a logically coherent suggestion, but I do not think that it could be true. I am willing to admit the logical possibility, but I think a sufficiently full analysis would show it to be semantically impossible.

I cannot think of any evidentiary basis for the success of terrorism in achieving any particular goal in the long term. Terrorism by the Islamo-fascists has achieved the short-term goal of engendering fear, anger, and publicity in the West, but I cannot identify any moral benefits of this, subject to the descriptions I have given in this article. This includes any justified beliefs from the perspective of the societies of the terrorists involved.

If terrorism really could be shown to be a good way of achieving some particular outcome, and could be identified as appropriate in some particular situation, then I would perhaps admit its rightness or goodness in that situation. But I have no reason for believing that this could ever be so. Certainly I am willing to admit the validity of the "greater good" argument as a justification for terrorism, but I am not willing to admit that the argument has ever been used successfully. The logical structure for the argument can be made, but I have never seen a constructed situation which is not absurd.

I would be happy to be corrected if someone could identify a historical or plausible example to contradict this, but until such time I do not think we need to entertain the possibility that terrorism could be an acceptable act.

Cheers,
-MP

A Philosophical Argument Against Terrorism Per Se

MelbournePhilosopher

In light of recent events, I thought a post on why I think terrorism is philosophically unjustified might be in order. For me the test of whether a particular act can be justified is whether you could consider doing the same thing if the situations were reversed.

Imagine that you lived in a world of extremism, and you had complete faith that you had to bring it down. What are the circumstances under which you might consider taking a terrorist action?

Another way of expressing this is to consider a clash of faiths. If two people have faith that the other needed to be killed, is either of them really more justified than the other?

This is the question I have to ask myself -- can I blame the terrorists for acting on their faith, and if not, why not? I find that yes, I can. What I present below is not to be regarded as the only thoughts I have on the matter, nor as a truly absolute position, but rather it is the result of my thinking about how to escape from reducing the argument to a mere clash of faiths, or pure relativism. It is my argument that terrorism is not right, even if one believes in moral relativism. Ultimately, even moral relativism must yield to human psychology and continuted human existence. Here, then is my suggestion:

I can appeal not only to an opposing faith, but to the principles of good reasoning and logic. One doesn't need to appeal to irrational faith in the rightness of one's position in order to show that terrorism is wrong, rather one can identify good reasons.

And this, ultimately, is what gives us the moral high ground. It is not only that our faith is being attacked, because to some extent moral rightness can be a matter of perspective, but it is also a matter of reasons.

Sound principles of human happiness, tolerance, understanding, self-interestedness, economic benefit, survival are all good reasons not to use terrorism as a weapon. Justifying terrorism (as opposed to war or mere violence which I believe can be justified) is always a direct appeal to faith, without a solid justifying reason. Terrorism is always a sacrifice of moral principles for a greater goal, and that greater goal is always only faith.

And when faith becomes disconnected with our intelligent, rational nature, it ceases to be reasonable. Faith, as the sole justification for a violent act, is always mistaken. Terrorism, I would argue, can only have faith as its ultimate justification, and therefore by implication is also always mistaken.

Cheers,
-MelbournePhilosopher

But That's Just Stupid

MelbournePhilosopher

One of the arguments that both academics and philosophers (often an intersecting pair of sets) have to deal with is what I call the "But That's Just Stupid" argument. The worst thing about it is that it's quite a good argument in the context of any particular problem.

The chief difficulty is that people want answers, whereas philosophy gives you, primarily, principles. Philosophy doesn't have to be so general and abstract, but in presenting a philosophical argument you almost always have to include both the answers and the philosophy rolled into one. The other major difficulty is not knowing all the facts. Here's an example of an unphilosophical claim:

Unemployment is around 5%, which is around the natural level. Therefore government is performing well.

Philosophically speaking, I have no problem with proceeding from the fact that unemployment is around the natural level to the conclusion that government is performing well. It doesn't seem reasonable to assess the government is underperforming if in fact unemployment is both low and normal.

Unfortunately, this argument quickly unravels when the true structure of (for example) Australian unemployment is understood. Rather than displaying an evenly distributed distribution, the great majority of incomes are in fact closer to the low end. Unemployment levels are not distributed evenly across various social groups. The unemployment rate fails to capture many people who are working part-time but would like more work, or are disabled, or for other reasons are not included statistically.

It is very easy for a good philosophical argument to reach poor conclusions based on even quite subtle untruths. Philosophical arguments are subject to chaos theory - a butterfly flapping its metaphorical wings can result in quite outrageous conclusions.

Similarly, many philosophical theories are developed not from a factual basis, but a theoretical one. One can often make a claim in the pursuit of one virtuous principle, only to discover that when applied to a factual example, the claim becomes farcicle in light of its other effects on the situation.

Failing to deal with the "But That's Just Stupid" argument is, I think, the primary reason for the sidelining of academia in this country. Well, that and their introverted nature and distance from the ordinary man. Let's just say it's a major reason. Academics have failed to overcome the bullshit detectors that we were all given at birth.

However, just because some arguments are vulnerable to this kind of attack doesn't mean that all arguments are vulnerable to this kind of attack. The challenge, as I see it, is to deal rationally and respecfully with people's cynicism. Rather than pursuing the most controversial elements of a doctrine, philosophers should concentrate on identifying theories which are robust.

As many philosophers are quick to point out, just because a theory doesn't fit the facts doesn't mean it can't help identify particular principles to which one should aspire. Being able to separate the argument from the facts can frequently help you to discover whether, for example, a person is merely *mistaken* in making a particular claim, or whether they are arguing poorly or pursuing a hidden agenda.

Similarly, identifying the difference between ignorance and difference can be important. Belief in a God is the kind of thing which involves a difference of faith, whereas the impact strength of a motor vehicle is not. Using the tools of philosophy it should be possible to be clear and explicit about these issues. Very often, I feel, people on two sides of a debate cannot even understand how it is that they can discuss their positions.

Let us return to our unemployment example -- is the real problem with unemployment one of personal empowerment, or is it rather an economic one?

For each person who is supported through the state, that money could potentially be used for saving lives medically. An argument commonly run is that recieving unemployment benefits should be a fundamental right -- that we owe it to them as humans. One counter-argument is that we don't owe it to them as humans. But there are many others, such as conflicting needs for the resources required to support a large unemployed population.

This is not the place to do a detailed dissection of the arguments commonly run, their clarity and knowability and so forth. Rather, it is an easily identified real issue where people frequently argue past eachother, or use a moral argument to oppose an economic one for example. It is philosophy which can give use the tools to make our meanings more explicit.

Philosophy's chief value is in allowing people to understand their own arguments.

Cheers,
-MP

A Change of Direction

MelbournePhilosopher

Today's post represents a change of direction for MP.com. It is felt that unless one moves the goalposts every now any then, one will simple get sick of kicking the same old goals. This site has now been up for around 8 months, and in that time has attracted a little over 5000 "visits", has recently seen a marked increase in the number of commenting readers (which is just fantastic to see), although the visits per day has dropped slightly. I'll take quality over quantity any day, of course!

To emphasise the "content makeover" I have also updated the template, just to mix things up a little. Over the coming week I will be posting primarily on the topics of how to bring fresh ideas to the site, what value blogging over the long term might have, the importance of connecting with a readership, and also connecting with ones own motivations.

Some of the things I am planning to include are :
* Posts of email correspondence arguments on philosophy
* Guest interviews (expert)
* Guest interviews (social)
* Photographs and other multimedia

On the other hand, I have decided to abandon a few things alse :
* No essay blog competition - this was intended primarily to be a driver of research among social philosophers, however it is felt that the interest is not there to support this. Instead, short article-based interaction and/or email based interaction is preferable.
* Daily posting - I will simply post when I feel like it, most probably around 3-4 days per week, as I am in fact doing now. Rather than posting daily as a training exercise, I will concentrate on keeping each post "on mission" instead.

I welcome any comment!

Cheers,
-MP

Jeff Kennet - Angel and Devil

MelbournePhilosopher

In fascinating piece of political drama, former Labour leader Mark Latham has been engaged in what seems to this un-educated eye to be some ... edgy ... behaviour. His actions have not failed to stir controversy in many areas.

This article in today's Age sums things up nicely, including a fascinating tirade by former Liberal shadow treasurer Dr Robert Dean on ABC Radio. MP had also heard the radio segment in question at the time.

Jeff Kennet is responsible for many things, but his career might be best described by the series of monuments he left behind. Jeff's Shed (The Exhibition Building), Jeff's Goalpoasts (The two concrete pillars straddling the Bolte Bridge tollway), Jeff's Car Race (the Australian Grand Prix) are perhaps the most visible. A pioneer of privatisation, legislative change and economic leadership simultaneously saw Victoria escape the fiscal doldrums, never mind who got hurt. His domineering style, strong leadership and frank success polarised the debate between those who could not accept his methods, and those who applauded his results.

For some, the first Kennet Era was a time in which the little guy was trod on, schools were closed, services rationalised. For others it signalled a rejuvenation of economic stability. Ultimately, it was probably both, and it could not last.

Eventually, the silent majority found their voice. Kennet was ejected from power in a manner not dissimilar to Latham's departure - a massive electoral loss. He, too, left disgracefully.

Kennet the Second is now a figurehead for the anti-depression movement. MP does not find it hard to imagine that Kennet was possessed of what might best be called an uncommon mental constitution. Nor does MP find it hard to imagine the Latham too walked to the beat of a different drummer.

All in all, the facts are best summarised in the referenced article. It serves as a central example of whether it is only the pot that really has the right to call the kettle black.

Cheers,
-MP