Thursday, June 30, 2005

The Disappearing Controversy Trick

MelbournePhilosopher

I'm a regular reader of "The Age", a Murdoch paper here in Melbourne, Aus. Despite its political leanings, I find it to be the best of the bunch for online reading, in terms of what content is free, quality of articles etc.

Around lunchtime, I read with interest the following article, still available from their archives : Tens of thousands march against IR changes

Now, at ten past two, the story has vanished entirely, with not a trace of it present on the front page. Instead of a government-critical rally involving hundreds of thousands of Australians protesting to defend what many see as very basic workplace rights, the top three articles are currently: "Couple feared lost in floods", "Travel agent convicted of dishonesty" and "Labor concerned over Centrelink crackdown".

The story has *also* been removed from the "breaking stories" page, which appears to list every addition to the online paper chronologically.

MP wonders what is happening over that "The Age", and what motivations caused the removal of this fascinating article.

Cheers,
-MP

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Philosophy, with a cold

MelbournePhilosopher

What it is like to think with a cold? It's clearly different. Nothing comes quite so easily, or so quickly. More mistakes are made, and motivation is lower. One has access, albeit unwillingly, to an alternative form of consciousness.

Imagine what the world would be like if everyone had a cold all of the time! Music would be more laid back, working hours would be much reduced. There would probably be fewer wars, and less intolerance. Can you seriously imagine carrying on a war with a foggy mind, lethargic body and a headache the size of Vietnam?

The downsides, of course, are equally unattractive. For one, going out drinking with friends would be a much more sober experience. Beer sales down, fruit juice and cold suppressants up.

Can one learn anything of value from introspection with a cold? Possibly, but I for one am too foggy-headed to find it.

Cheers,
-MP

Sunday, June 26, 2005

Losing Interest

MelbournePhilosopher

Losing interest in something is a strange experience. Recently, for example, I have been struggling to maintain my posting rate on the blog. There have been other things too, and I suspect they are related. It happens slowly, but it's interesting how you can have a progression from something which really motivated and excited you, to finding that same thing an indifferent pleasure at best.

What is it that happens inside someone's head when they find their interest on the decline. Ignoring things like depression or stress as underlying psychological problems, it still seems well within a person's natural thought processes.

I think that this phenomena is a powerful piece of evidence from introspection into human nature. It is an example of (and I so hate to admit it), Heidegger's idea of thrown-ness. That is to say we find ourselves thrown into the world in a particular state of mind, without having particularly much control or understanding of it. There is no simple effort of will which can bring back the enjoyment of an activity, nor make us happy, nor sad. Of course there are some things we can do to improve ourselves, but what those things are need to be identified and studied. They are not apparent to us.

Disclosing what will make us happy, or motivated, or whatever is one of the tasks of philosophy or psychology, and would make rich ground for further study. It is interesting that few philosophers take very seriously the connection between happiness and philosophical correctness, even those who rank philosophy as being a very important thing. In so far as my position goes, I am barracking for Plato's position that an unexamined life is not worth living.

Nonetheless, my examinations have not as yet revealed to me the fundamental nature of my own changing motivations. Perhaps it does all boil down to evolution, but even so, that is not a functional analysis of great use.

Oh well. Perhaps I will work it out tomorrow.

Cheers,
-MP

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Competitive Pricing Schemes

MelbournePhilosopher

I was thinking ... we have a privatised but heavily regulated electricity industry here in Aus. There is a bit of kerfuffle at the moment with the government wanting to drop the electricity prices a little ($82 per year - on average, presumably) and the electricity companies don't want to. While this is hardly surprising, their argument seems pretty good - they need that money for infrastructure spending. They've improved their efficiency (hence the "windfall" profit) but now they want to reap what they have sown.

So how's this for a pricing scheme. Take the average price for electricity. Presumably, half the companies will be making a profit at this level, and half will be making a loss. Well, actually most people will be making some profit. But there will be some point offset from here where that's true. The precise formula isn't that important.

Let's say we can identify the price point at which 75% of electricity companies will be at break-even or better, and 25% will be worse off than break-even. We then regulate this number to be the most that any provider is allowed to charge for their services. As well as this, we give people tax breaks for engaging in R&D, including infrastructure extension.

So every company has to compete hard so as not to fall into the bottom 25%, everyone gets breaks for engaging in R&D which will hopefully work out to more efficient electricity delivery, lower costs and better reliability, and the guys at the top get to make a tidy profit for being so good at what they do.

Okay, maybe this is just a pipe-dream idea. The primary objection that occurs to me is that electricity supply is an oligopoly, so you can't divide things so neatly. Also, it kind of forces 25% of the players to run at a loss, which isn't too good. But those in the bottom 25% could offset their loss by engaging in infrastructure rollout and extra R&D.

Ultimately, all that is probably necessary is a full publishing of a range of fine-grained metrics. Natural competition, on proper information, will probably take care of the rest.

Just a ramble! :)

Cheers,
-MP

Tuesday, June 21, 2005

Genetic Testing of Athletes

MelbournePhilosopher

Gattaca, here we come. I for one welcome our new genetically enhanced overlords...

"Two of the AFL's most powerful clubs are considering DNA testing young recruits to test their likely height, strength, speed and stamina." ... from today's Age .

This, of course, is an issue much discussed, and seldom resolved. Actually, it's usually resolved by people agreeing how bad it would be, but I think that's just ducking the question. There are many benefits that genetic selection and artificial improvement could bring.

Sure, it's just a step away from eugenics, one of the philosophical ideas used to justify the Nazi movement, but here proponents could claim they had a scheme where nobody loses - or at least nobody loses their head.

Here's the real question. Is Australian AFL the first? Does anyone from overseas have links to evidence that this kind of thing might really be put into practise? Where else can we identify genuine examples of genetic selection such as being described here?

Cheers,
-MP

Friday, June 17, 2005

The Nature of Success (from the mailbag)

MelbournePhilosopher

A friend writes ... "I dont know if you do requests, but it would be interesting to see MelbournePhilospher's viewpoint on the nature of success. I had an interesting discussion at lunch on its psychological, economic and cultural aspects - and whether these are relative or absolute - e.g. does one aim for a particular goal, or is that goal entirely relative to environment and peers.

Is there a philosophical viewpoint or construct that can be brought to the table?

Or does any of it matter?"


Well, the easiest way to wriggle out of giving an opinion in this fairly subjective area is to present the ancient Greek conception of Eudaimonia . Briefly, this concept refers to living well, and to a kind of satisfaction with life than can only be achieved by living in accordance with ones principles. By linking a state of being with the results of acting morally, the Greeks manage to deflate any friction brought about by the idea of achieving happiness through wealth alone.

Psychologically speaking, humans have a wide and inconsistent set of desires, both known and unknown. One of the difficulties in life is that too often we don't even know what will bring us contentment. Most people would accept that some rich people are not happy, and that while wealth provides an escape from many of the pains of this world, it does not guarantee contentment.

In this debate, the maximisation of some particular mental state is often put forward. If only we could be happy all the time, we shall have achieved the best for ourselves that can be achieved. This viewpoint is known as psychological hedonism. The debate surrounding hedonism is very much still present in our lives - are we better off meeting our wildest desires, thus experiencing the extremes of self gratification, or is this a false grail, and instead we should temper our desires comensurate with our ability to fulfil them. Is it better to desire less, and thus be always happy? Are there any kinds of better ways of finding happiness, if the happiness achieved is the same? Is it better to be a happy fool?

When presented with extreme theoretical positions - such as that of a slave who is made happy through drugs - most people accept that there is something wrong with aspiring to such a situation. Even unphilosophical people accept that there is something about the problem which goes beyond mere happiness, and towards a notion that there is a right kind of happiness which is only achieved through a certain degree of morally good behaviour. This is the problem of psychological hedonism, and speaks in favour of eudaimonia, the contentedness that comes from having lived well.

There is a certain amount of evidence from psychology that the desire for material wealth is a relative one. It is clearly contextual - a peasant in the 1500's has not got the conceptions to desire a laptop computer for example. But beyond this, there is a certain sense in which what people desire is to have more than their fellows. This view poses a degree of difficulty to the Greek modes of thought, which are primarily concerned with the character of the individual. What kind of person, they ask, will best embody the good person, and how can we be like that?

Is success, then, something introverted, and ultimately about you? Is success any more than a feeling of satisfaction with ones life? Perhaps. But for many of us, we are still left wondering exactly what it is that we are supposed to do about it.

In a world with objective values - such as Christian metaphysics - you can have success criteria for a life. I think most people would accept that there is a little wriggle-room even in many quite prescriptive ideologies, and many paths to choose. Within any particular ideology, philosophical ones included, the particular other things you believe are likely to help define some metrics for success. Approached without a moral compass, success is perhaps a strange word, because ones actions are undirected. One needs to have a conception of what goals are worth pursuing, even if only in a basic form such as the pursuit of wealth or happiness, if one is to adopt any consequentialist position.

Those, ultimately, are the possibilities. The satisfaction of living well, the achievement of ones moral goals, or attainment of objective success according to a doctrine. Unfortunately, you still have to choose one for yourself.

Cheers,
-MP

Thursday, June 16, 2005

Paternity Fraud

MelbournePhilosopher

Last night I had the privilege of attending a Heart of Philosophy cafe, whose speaker Dr Leslie Cannold was addressing the issue of paternity fraud. The discussion was fascinating, and I couldn't possibly cover the issue as well as her hour-long presentation, and subsequent hour-long Q and A session managed to do.

However, I must say I got a new perspective on these issues, which included a fascinating presentation of the latest research, much of which is being still actively prepared, and which also repudiates much accepted wisdom.

So, what is paternity fraud? Simply put : situations where, in the eyes of the law, the legal status of "parent" is mis-attributed. This can be due to a whole barrel-full of emotionally charged reasons, ranging from privacy issues surrounding IVF babies, to secretive liaisons between adultrous partners. Simple genetic identification is only the simplest issue in this web of responsibility and intrigue.

In Australia, law is currently undergoing a shift towards a genetic emphasis on fatherhood. Additionally, supervisory bodies are being given increasingly invasive powers to assert the rule of law in these cases, including direct removal of funds without approval from individual's bank account. In what I suspect is an economically rather than morally motivated move, the responsibilities of parenthood are being coldly enforced.

Advocates on all sides of this multi-faceted arena are complaining. These complaints revolve around the normative view of the nuclear family, respect for the social father, issues of multiple social fathers, access rights and their possible linkage to economic responsibilities, fear, uncertainty and doubt.

I can only recommend further investigating these issues for yourself. Leslie Cannold was able to give us a marvelous one-minute-manager description of the issues, which as one might expect raised some spirited discussion. It was marvellous to see. If only John Howard had been there!

Cheers,
-MP

Tuesday, June 14, 2005

Blaming the System (a.k.a. Damn The Man)

MelbournePhilosopher

What does it mean to "blame the system"? Is this the same thing as distributively blaming all the people responsible for the system? Who, if anyone, should be made to make amends for a bad system? What constitutes a bad system anyway?

Rather than try to discover what makes a good system, which involves a web of concepts like justice, fairness, etc, let's just assume that the system is simply either objectively good, or objectively bad, and go on from there. Myself, I would argue that such an ascription will always be of mixed value - something is seldom wholly good or wholly bad, but let us work with a broad brush for the time being.

Let's suppose a person called Adam is suffering, and percieves "the system" to be either the cause of, a contributing factor to, or failing to give relief from his sufferent. Either Adam is right or Adam is wrong. If he is wrong, then his blaming of the system is simply the result of poor reasoning. If he is right, then we must come to terms with why this is so, and what the implications may be.

Let's make this a concrete example, such as someone on unemployment benefits. Many people on unemployment benefits are there because, for one reason or another, they are not attractive as potential employees. Furthermore, sometimes this is because they are unemployment benefits, or for some other linked reason such as low education or a variety of other socio-economic factors.

Adam may choose to "blame the system" - being unemployed further exaggerates downsides that might not be immediately obvious from simply not having a job. The system, designed to address the needs of the unemployed, is failing in its task. Other systems which routinely fail in their goals are the police system, education, mental health, aged care, etc. In these examples, all else being equal, the system can be said to be at least partially responsible for Adam's situation.

There are three problems which seem to me to be paramount in these kinds of problems.

One is that these systems are almost always a kind of triage - they ignore those who cannot be saved and those who might save themselves, and concentrate on the remainder. One might say that these systems are designed to fail some elements of society.

The second is one of limited resources. Society is largely unwilling to bear the full resource cost of a system which addresses the issues fully - sometimes they are literally unable to. Indeed, a gain in one area comes often at the cost of another, and some issues cannot be solved only with money. Other scarce resources, such as inspired leaders and hard workers are often equally hard to come by.

The third is the philosophical issue of blame - who is to be held to account. These systems inevitably involve large numbers of individuals, each of whom could maybe do a lot more if singled out, but bears little personal responsibility and holds little power. The systems themselves are in a sense alive - being affected by and affecting those individuals with whom it comes into contact. Holding actual people to account, in order to get restitution or implement change, is often a difficult process.

This last issue is probably the most hotly contended in intellectual circles.

The first issue is seen as largely inevitable, and not the result of poor thinking or poor implementation. While the precise decisions are often divided between, for example, left-wing and right-wing politics, usually the division is a fairly straightforward ideological one, and falls out naturally from the positions held by each group. The second issue is also a no-fault (or sometimes everybody's fault) issue. Some systems may be underfunded relative to their efficiency, which is a correctable problem, but ultimately everyone must simple do the best they can with the resources they have.

Now that the position has been outlined, I will present some specific positions on blame over the coming days...

Cheers,
-MP

Friday, June 10, 2005

Who is interested in philosophy anyway?

MelbournePhilosopher

There seems to be a big divide between the number of people with questions and the number of people interested in philosophy.

Large amounts of time, money and publicity go into new-age therapies, self-help books, weight loss, economic and political theory, biographies and semi-fictional books with a message. Philosophy is a word that brings both confusion and curiousity into the minds of the un-initiated. People, broadly, are interested.

Yet that level of interest often fails to convert into the book deals, speaker events, media publicity and so forth that all the others command virtually without effort. People know what they are getting when they read a newspaper, but they can quickly find themselves lost on a philosophy blog such as this. Presumably, whatever gives them that uncomfortable feeling - be it an academic tone, too complex a theory, the lack of an obvious-to-anyone connection between the argument at hand and the implications for their own lives - is what holds philosophy back. Maybe it's the determined tone put by someone who is advancing a critical argument that makes people dis-engage.

People other than the general public also fail to engage - politicians, journalists, lawyers, doctors and judges are also notably absent. A few short semesters of jurisprudence, media ethics of "History and Philosophy of X" subjects are often the total exposure of these individuals to what I might term academic philosophy. Yet these people are precisely the ones relied on to be able to distinguish between a strong and weak moral position, between right and wrong, between a sound argument and a bad one in practical terms.

Is it that academic philosophy is necessarily a pen-pushing affair - like the relationship between pure mathematics and engineering?

For myself, I don't think so. I myself have studied philosophy after entering the workforce, and feel I have answered the challenge of having a practically relevant professional perspective. Philosophy for me isn't just an exercise in the manipulation of ideas, but something which I use to build most of my opinions. It can help me decide when to suspend judgement and when to form an opinion, how to recognise when an emotional attitude is actually harming me versus when it is doing me good.

So why isn't this true for most people? Why don't we see the enthusiastic engagement by public figures of power and authority in the debates presented in, for example, this blog or any other like it?

Whoa, time's up! More later if I have any good ideas on this...

Cheers,
-MP

Thursday, June 09, 2005

Free Will and Liberty

MelbournePhilosopher

Is a belief in free will just an excuse to hold people wholly responsible for their actions? While free will is often framed against nihlistic Determinism, I don't think that Determinism is what people have in mind when they are typically talking about someone not being responsible for their own actions.

Determinism, the idea that people have no true choice over their actions due to fundamental physical laws, contains implicitly a rejection of morality. If there is no choice, then no person is truly good or bad, as they are not the authors of their own actions.

Let us take this example of someone with a reduced sense of free will. Jerry is overweight, and has low self esteem. He is unable to conceive of achieving the kinds of things achieved by fitter, more confident, more wealthy, "better" people. He is unable, in a very real sense, to overcome his own mental limitations. These problems are not necessitated by any physical laws (disregarding fundamental deterministic issues), but are the result of his choice. Jerry appears to have chosen his own situation, because others of us can see how me might have chosen differently.

Someone subscribing wholly to free will might hold Jerry to be entirely responsible for his position. While he might have undergone a difficult past, the reaction to that was open to his free will. He could have chosen otherwise, and the free will advocate must place the final responsibility with the agent of choice. The expression "agent" or "agency" refers to this idea that Jerry is the one who has manufactured his own mental state.

How does this relate to liberty? There are many ways, and here is a short list

1 By forcing someone into a particular mental state, if possible, one can reduce a person's freedom. Indoctrination is a tool for affecting a person's freedom if one does not hold the position that people have perfect free will
2 By accepting that a person's free will is affected by their environment, one accepts that freedom is not merely a matter deliberate opposition
3 Two people with different mental states can be in the same situation, but have different levels of freedom
4 A political party can make people free by changing their mental state, not just their situation
5 People can *blame* a political party for their degree of freedom
6 Poverty, as a statistical determinant of many psychological problems, becomes a tool for freedom or constraint
7 By virtue of (3), equal opportunity is not necessarily sufficient for equality of fairness

This is a thought in progress...

Cheers,
-MP

Wednesday, June 08, 2005

Quantifying Liberty

MelbournePhilosopher

If I wanted to know how free I was, who could I ask? I don't know of anyone. How can I work it out for myself? What does it mean to assign a quantity to freedom anyway?

Clearly, there are examples where one is clearly denied a choice that would otherwise be open to you - it is possible to have all of your choices taken from you - it is possible to have no freedom. Prisoners have little to no freedom.

On the other end of the spectrum, some people are clearly relatively un-encumbered by denials of choice. However, they are often constrained by the relative benefit of their choices - perhaps they are constrained by a mortgage, perhaps they are very rich but constrained by their social role. Freedom, it would seem, is open-ended. There is nobody immediately identifiable who is perfectly free. Where does this leave any potential scale of freedom? How might we judge the relative freedom of two people who are not currently being imprisoned? It's hard to say.

It might be possible equate freedom with the number of available options that a person has. This number, of course, depends on being able to count their possible actions. Freedom consists in having many possible actions, and in being permitted to take them. At the most abstract level, freedom can even be a function of imagination. This may sound far-fetched, but I think it is quite obvious when you consider the example of someone who is labouring under some false sense of duty, or who lacks the confidence to do a particular thing, or is embarassed. These people are not in the fullest sense of the word free.

Is it possible, from these principles, to establish how much freedom a person has? Is there any sense in which freedom could be quantized, in an exchangable way? Is the freedom, for example, brought about by wealth, as valuable as the freedom brought about through a good imagination? Is the unfreedom of being imprisoned worse than the unfreedom of poverty?

In the past I have argued for a separation of kind between having options available versus having the permission to take them. I still believe there is a clear distintinction, however I don't believe the word freedom can be used to accurately refer to only one of them. I tend now to think of liberty as referring to the permissive aspect of freedom, and have not yet come up with a good word for referring to the possibilty aspect of freedom.

This post is a thought in progress...

Cheers,
-MP

Tuesday, June 07, 2005

My kind of libertarian

MelbournePhilosopher

I've always called myself a libertarian, because I think that the principle of liberty is the most important principle by which to determine issues of fairness and justice. Recently, I've been challenged on this, with someone claiming that other people call themselves libertarians but believe different things.

So, what's liberty anyway? For me, liberty means freedom of choice in the sense of not being restricted by some political entity. It means being allowed to do whatever the hell I want to do without other people telling me I can't. Clearly, we should have some limits on liberty, because some people will want to do things which run counter to the common good - they will exploit others, kill people, and otherwise be a total downer on society. I don't believe that one person's rights outweight another's, but I do believe that the most basic principle by which people can argue for better treatment is liberty.

People existing in such a society are permitted by law to act outside of social norms so long as those actions do not directly impinge upon the liberty of another. The law exists not to enforce social norms, but to preserve the liberty of a country's citizens. This allows the existence of a morally diverse citizenship, as well as the satisfaction of a wide range of desires.

So, what *else* does liberty mean other than this? As far as I can tell, the broad outline I have put has been used by some as a defense for actions which, in fact, do impinge upon the liberty of others. They claim that the principle of liberty is *more important* than traditional principles of justice - for example the right to pollute your environment. A prime example of a contentious claim might be the right of city-dwellers to drive large 4WD vehicles. They are proven to be detrimental on balance (more damaging to crash victims than the safety benefits they confer to their occupants) to society, yet the drivers of such vehicle claim that the right to consumer choice trumps the rights of society to personal safety. To me, this is libertarianism gone made - a corruption of the idea of balancing the conflicting needs of society according to principles of choice.

For example, the right to personal safety is itself capable of being derived from my ideals of liberty. Being killed or harmed because of the actions of another is clearly an example of an aggressor taking away some of your choice. Certainly, a dog-eat-dog society where people have to compete for personal safety will not give people as much personal freedom as one in which personal safety is by and large protected.

Cheers,
-MP

Monday, June 06, 2005

Goodbye Heidegger, Hello Sunshine!

MelbournePhilosopher

And that's a wrap. Today I sat my exam for the rightly maligned "Philosophy and Existentialism" course. As much as I hate the use of "I" on this blog, today it could not be avoided. Today let us pose the question - why do I hate Heidegger, but love philosophy? How is it that the opinions of one man could so change my attitudes to this subject that provides so much depth of thought and richness of understanding? How can so many ardent fans of his work be wrong?

Commence Very Long Rant.

Heidegger is a kind of hero-figure, one of the Great Ancestors of existentialism, and the lifeblood of modern philosophy - or so some would have you believe. This German cut a grouchy but imposing figure, producing his opus "Being and Time" in an almost violent rebellion against philosophical history since ancient times.

The chief difficulty I have with Heidegger is his love of complexity and alienating language. If Wittgenstein were alive today, he might well accuse the big H of playing an enormous language-game, the result of which is to confound the truth so completely that one no longer recognise it. An obsession with partially borrowed meanings and philosophical mumbo jumbo is his sin.

The central tenet of Heidegger's thought is that there is some unifying concept which underlies the meaning of all human existence. Of course, he only reaches this point on about page 300. He starts, instead, with a discussion the meaning of which cannot be guessed at. Life in its every-dayness. Being as such. He tries so hard to find an underlying system for understanding living and dying that he finds one. For him, phenomenology is an attempt to capture existence as though it itself has structure. The existence of "Dasein" - in a nutshell human existence - he argues has certain structures and ways of existing which are revealed by looking at all the different ways they can exist.

It is my firm belief that he has fallen into a language trap - the trap of is. What "is" existence. What is being "as" such. All these phrases which he so dearly uses contain within them the linguistic feature of describing a thing. Not necessarily an existing thing, but nonetheless a conceptual unit which can be talked about meaningfully.

For me, there is no "answer" to what it means to exist. The answer, as I have stated before, is just the meaning we give to it. For Heidegger, the mission is to discover unifying consistencies between all the different ways in which humans exist. Is this possible? Even he admits not. What he proposes is that there are unifying structures to the modes of existence we find ourselves in.

Underlying that structure is itself another common element. Each can be seen as an example of a human showing concern for the world around him. Humans have existential - which in this case means a kind of pre-theoretical capacity - for understanding the world around them. Any specific account of existence is assigned another moniker - existentiell.

Well, I think it's an easy claim to accept that man's mental structures allow him to interpret the world in many ways. But is this really the meaning of life? At the end of the chain of reasoning, is our life merely a kind of hard-wired concern for the world in which we find ourselves? Are we simply curious? Do we really need thirty new words, cut from bastardised English and German to put forward the position that man has certain natural structures of interpreting the world?

Even more ridiculous I find are his claims about authenticity and in-authenticity. Inauthenticity is the simplest to consider - a naive understanding of the world in terms of that which we have been merely taught, rather than analysing ourselves. This position is hardly new - it is put as strongly by the most opposite view I can think of, that of objectivism - so I am discinclined to be amazed. Authenticity is the awareness that our own nature is colouring and defining our view.

Spread out over hundreds of incomprehensible pages are such simple observations, couched in language such as ready-at-hand, worldhood, thrownness, existential and existentiell, ontic and ontological, factical and factual, historical and historicity - ridiculous terms used and altered to reflect a confused thought process, created to escape a confusion that was created only by failing to understand the difference between grammatical structure and meaning.

Heidegger is sent spinning the the admittedly sometimes irritating tendency of philosopher to argue for particular interpretations of the world which are clearly equally valid or invalid. Theories of existence are overturned daily, leaving one frustrated and angry at out inability to come to any sensible conclusions about our own lives.

The search for a meta-structure to existence, the boiling down of meaning into an overcomplex theoretical superstructure of human understanding is an attempt to answer why the questions of philosophy seem to so quickly fall apart.

Heidegger was left with the only two certainties which he could see - mortality and care for the world. However he himself was guilty of his own sin. He created a system, and argued for it, and now its fundamentals are in question. Perhaps he himself could not concieve of a world in which conscious beings did not die, or of people who did not fit his pre-theoretic structures, but every day I see reasons to deviate from the structure he puts forward.

His observations are sometimes acute, but the language-world he has constructed for himself to me seems to be merely a sytematic shield by which he severs the connection between his claims and true meaning. For me, something is true if one can act in the world as though it were true. Heidegger has created a system which is not falsifiable. By thinking and acting, per se, I am proving his system. What he has described is the meaning of life in terms which have no meaning, and thus no falsehood - and no truth.

Anyone who's still with me, sorry for the rant. Oh, and I believe existentialism gets much better than Heidegger.

So, the conclusion? Heidegger attacks everything which I hold valuable about philosophy. He travels from observation not toward meaning but away from it. Not toward meaningful statements but toward statements which are so general as to have no meaning - to make no claim. Instead of adding richness to our language and thoughts, he adds complexity and descriptions only of themselves.

Cheers,
-MP

Friday, June 03, 2005

Vinyard in Autumn


Vinyard in Autumn Posted by Hello

Here's another photo I took recently. I've been posting these with "Hello" - a neat piece of software I got from the blogger homepage which deals with all the auto-sizing and thumbnail stuff so that I don't have to.

This morning on #774, there was a lively debate about whose rights are trumps in the sperm donor game. Currently, the laws are being altered to more closely to reflet our laws on adoption, which changes the role and the rights of both donors and children to make contact with one another.

There was a lively debate in which each interested group (parents, donors and children) were each putting their case. Each one stood to lose out potentially under the new laws. Which isn't to say it's all roses now, but there is the additional principle of not moving the goalpoasts to consider.

For example, children who are unaware of their genetic origins might get contacted under the new rules to see if they would be interested in meeting their donor fathers. This might, obviously, be quite a shock to the system.

On the other hand, children who do know their origins are often intensely curious as to their origins, and it is felt they have the right to know more about their genetic father.

Parents who have not told their children also have a major stake in this, as this might have done for reasons which will now be undermined.

Given this web of complexity, MP wonders whether truth might not point the way. Are people so emotionally flimsy that they must be protected from damaging truths, or is it not simply better to know according to other principles? Yes, a family might be hurt, but is emotional pain the sole factor in this decision? By what other principles than this might we help resolve the issue?

Cheers,
-MP

Thursday, June 02, 2005

79% Good

MelbournePhilosopher

I am in a friendly competition with this unfortunately quite fun blog, using the Battle of the Blogs system over at Blog Explosion. (Oooh rah!)

I decided to check out the competition, and came across yet another cool web survey thing. Totally unphilosophical, but cool.

This site is certified 79% GOOD by the Gematriculator

Tee hee hee I'm 79% good. I wonder which bits are the good bits?

Cheers,
-MP

Aristotle in the Cafe

MelbournePhilosopher

Heart of Philosophy cafe regulars last night had the pleasure of listening to Steven Curry channelling Aristotle for a few pleasant hours last night at Murmur bar.

Aristotle (via transwarp conduit) presented convincing arguments for the virtue of the mean, as well as making some excellent points about rationality, heriosm and courage. One problem people sometimes have is a sudden rush of guilt over their fortunate position in the world. Taking this guilt to its extreme, it can seem as though nothing less that Sainthood constitutes a morally acceptable lifestyle.

The point put by A. was that this wasn't particularly rational. There's no judgement involved in becoming a saint. For A., the best place to seat yourself was half-way between cowardice and foolishness. One should neither be unable to take risks for moral goals, nor should one be so foolish that one ignored the inherent dangers in doing so. Ask yourself - consider the people you look up to as moral heroes. Maybe Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King - anyone on your personal list. You might admire their lives - but would you actually want them for yourselves? Would you really want to make your lives like theirs?

Many moral heroes, rather than being consistently saintly, are rather defined by a moment of moral courage. This, it is argued, is a good attitude. The best way to live is not a path of constant self-sacrifice, of foolhardy risks for the supposed benefit of others, but rather to have the capacity to recognise those moments when moral courage is called for. When to fight, and when to back down, in other words.

Variously during the procedures, Steven Curry would emerge from behind his ancient Greek persona to put some of his own views forward. His own position, he argues, was that people involved in moral thinking adopt any one of several modes. They then reach a final position by considering these on balance . Traditionally, however, it was proposed that people arguing philosophically tend to see these modes as exclusive, giving primacy to one or the other as the best way of thinking morally.

These modes are, loosely, virtue ethics of the kind proposed by Aristotle, virtue ethics of the kind proposed by Christianity, consequentialism and utilitarianism. No doubt I have missed some.

A. virtue ethics are very much concerned with what kind of character a moral person should have. Consequentialism, on the other hand, takes notice not of the actor but the actions. What kind of actions are morally good or bad? From their actions shall they be known.

Anyway, I have run out of time and space, and haven't managed to give anything like a proper covering of events.

Cheers,
-MP

Wednesday, June 01, 2005

Philosopher's Carnival 14

MelbournePhilosopher

The next Philosopher's Carnival is now up and ready, with, as always, a wide variety of posts. This includes my open question on the meaning of life, which I hope is a theme that might get taken up around the philoso-sphere in time for the next one.

However, as Philosophy, etc points out, philosophers might just get irritated by addressing such an inexpert question, or more accurately in the interaction with philosophical amateurs.

When it comes to the meaning of life, is there such a thing as an expert and an amateur? Does it make sense to say that untrained people are unable to get proper insight into their own existence, or do they get that insight simply by being alive?

Answering this question might give more bite to people who suggest that philosophy is necessary to get the most out of life, or perhaps take the wind out of their sales if one of the most primary philosophical questions could be answered equally well by anyone who happens to have a good idea.

Cheers,
-MP